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Abstract
In this note I argue that the desirability of scal policy in response to the current crisis depends on
whether one views the current crisis as a temporary deviation from a unique equilibrium or as a bad
equilibrium out of multiple equilibria. The paper presents a simple Diamond (1982) type of model where
rms must nd an (investment) bank to nance their projects and the investment banks sell risky assets
to get capital from investors. Due to coordination frictions, the economy can get stuck in an ine¢ cient
low-trade equilibrium. Finally, I briey discuss some of the policies that have recently been put forward
to stimulate the economy in the context of this model.
I am grateful for comments received from Marloes Lammers and Arjen Siegmann.
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1 Introduction
When entrepreneurs must make costs ex ante, i.e. write a business proposal, buy a patent etc. and the
returns to their investment depend on the willingness of banks to provide credit, which on turn depends
on the willingness of investors to buy risky assets, the economy can get stuck in an ine¢ cient equilibrium.
The fact that the total stock market losses are many times larger than the estimated 2.2 trillion potential
deterioration in U.S.- originated credit assets held by banks and others is consistent with the view that there
are multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria of the Diamond (1982) type.
In August 2007, the rst signs came that housing market was overvalued in the US. Before this period,
monetary policy in the US focussed on providing more liquidity and keeping interest rates low rather than at
the quality and transparency of the banks balance sheets. The low interest rates and the salary schemes in
the banking sector stimulated the development of risky assets like the complex mortgage-backed securities.
The interconnection of the banking system made the system more robust against small shocks but less robust
to the risks of "tail" events, see Acemoglu (2009) and Hartmann, Straetmans and de Vries (2004). Since the
house-price-and-related-asset bubble has bursted, there has been a ight to quality in the nancial sector.
Lucas (2008) describes this as: "Everyone wants to get into government-issued and government-insured
assets, for reasons of both liquidity and safety". Caballero and Kurlat (2008) argue that while the US as a
whole is regarded to be save (and this still leads to net capital inows), all other forms of funding dried up.
Similar arguments hold for savers, see Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Flight to quality is not specic for the
current crisis but has been reported to take place in many cyclical downturns.1 Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2008,
2009) give evidence that the current crisis shows a lot of similarities with past crises around the entire world.
In the model, I study the e¤ect of this ight to quality on investment behavior and credit supply. I
show that for certain congurations, ight-to quality can destroy an e¢ cient trade equilibrium and that in
that case, government intervention is required to prevent the economy from getting stuck in an ine¢ cient
no-trade equilibrium. I also show that because of macro-economic complementarities the social returns to
investing in risky assets exceeds the private returns.
Besides Diamond (1982) the model is related to Silviera and Wright (2006) who consider a search model
where entrepreneurs search for venture capital. In their model there is a more active role for the capital
supplier in judging projects but they do not consider the coordination frictions which I focus on in this
paper. Cooper and John (1988) give a nice overview of other sources of coordinations failures and sources
of multiple equilibria in models with macroeconomic complementarities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and gives a numerical example and
section 3 discusses some of the recent policy proposals in the light of this model.
1See e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) and Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993).
2
2 The model
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how after a ight-to quality in the nancial sector, the economy
can get stuck in an ine¢ cient equilibrium and that there is potential scope for government intervention. For
this goal I choose to write down an extremely stripped down model where I leave many factors out that
are important to understand the current crisis, like asymmetric information, deregulation, heterogeneity in
projects etc. thereby sacricing realism for simplicity. This enables me to isolate the e¤ects of coordination
frictions.
2.1 Assumptions
Suppose rms nd projects (or receive ideas) at rate  per unit of time where time is continuous. Once the
rm has a project, it can start it at a cost c. Think of c as the cost of writing a business proposal to the bank,
getting a patent etc.. Before the project can be implemented and made protable, the rm must nd a bank
with su¢ cient resources to nance the project. Normalize the total number of rms to 1 of which L have a
project and (1  L) have no project. Banks are very simple in this world. In total there are N banks, B of
them have su¢ cient funds and N  B is the number of banks that are looking for investors who want to buy
a risky asset (the investors or investors). This goes as follows, the bank sells a risky asset in exchange for
an amount of capital z. Assume that there are S investors who are willing to buy a risky asset. The current
ight to quality can be interpreted as a reduction in S. The total number of contacts between banks and
investors is given by  (N  B)S; so investors who want to buy risky assets meet banks at rate  (N  B)
and the banks meet the investors at rate S. Each investor pays z0 for the risky asset and in return she
receives z > z0 if the bank nds a rm with a good project. So the asset is risky in the sense that if the bank
nds no rm with a project, the investor makes a loss of  z0. So banks act as intermediaries between rms
that need money and investors who buy risky assets. Roughly speaking, this is what investment banks did
before the crisis. Assume that investors can hold at most one risky asset. A rm and a bank with su¢ cient
resources who have contacted each other jointly implement the project and receive in total 2u+ z. I assume
that this is shared, through symmetric Nash bargaining, i.e. both the rm and the bank receive u and the
buyer of the risky asset receives her promised return z. Assume that rms can undertake only one project
at a time. Further, assume that banks cannot do anything else with z0 then nance the projects of rms
and that there is no storage possible, i.e. banks can hold funds for only one investment project at a time.
The idea is that banks need su¢ cient capital before they can lend to the rms. This simplication allows
me to ignore the distribution of assets over banks. The total number of contacts between banks and rms is
LB per unit of time where L is the total number of rms with projects and B is the number of banks with
funds (i.e. which sold a risky asset). Agents discount the future at rate r. N;S; ; ; ; c; r; u; z0 and z are
all exogenous (although for the investors, there is a participation constraint that expected payo¤s must be
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non-negative).2 Finally, I only consider symmetric strategies and focus on the steady state where B;L are
constant over time.
2.2 Characterization
Let VNP and VP be the values for rms of being in states NP (having no project and looking for one) and
P (having a project and looking for a bank to nance it). Then,
rVNP = max [VP   VNP   c; 0] : (1)
At rate  the rms nd projects. When they nd one, they gain the di¤erence in value of state P and
NP , and pay a cost c if they believe the project to be protable. If they expect the investment to not be
protable, they do not invest and receive 0. The value for a rm of having an implementable project is,
rVP = B (u+ VNP   VP ) (2)
At rate B an individual rm meets a bank with su¢ cient funds. In that case, the rm receives u and
switches to state NP:
Denote the value of a bank without funds by VNF and with funds by VF : Then,
rVNF = Smax[VF   VNF ; 0]: (3)
Banks meet investors who are willing to buy risky assets at rate S and switch from state NF to state F if
this occurs. Since banks cannot do anything else with z0 than nance investments, there is no direct value
of owning z0: The value of having funds for a bank is,
rVF = L (u+ VNF   VF ) : (4)
Banks with funds meet rms at rate L and they receive u if this occurs. The asset value for an investor
who wants to buy a risky asset is:
rVNR = (N  B) [VR   VNR   z0] : (5)
At rate (N  B) she meets a bank without funds, switches to state R and buys the risky asset for z0 from
the bank. When she owes a risky asset the ow value of her state is:
rVR = L [z   (VR   VNR)] : (6)
At rate L her bank meets a rm with a project and it receives z and switches to state NR.
There are two steady state conditions; one for the banks, and one for the rms. First, for the banks,
S (N  B) I1 = BL; (7)
2We can think of the size of agents who own or want to own a risky asset as M where S agents are looking for a bank to
buy the risky asset from and M   S agents own a risky asset. All relations below hold for any value of M , S.
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where I1 is an indicator variable which has value 1 if it is protable for the investors to exchange a risky
asset for cash with the bank and 0 otherwise. The inow of banks with resources is equal to the number of
banks without resources that meet and sell a risky asset in exchange for capital: (S (N  B)). The outow
of banks with capital is equal to the number of contacts between banks and rms with projects (LB). The
steady state condition for rms is,
 (1  L)  I2 = BL; (8)
where I2 is an indicator variable which has value 1 if rms who receive an idea/project pay the cost c and
start to look for a bank and 0 otherwise. So the inow of rms with feasible projects is the number of rms
who receive a project and pay the setup cost ( (1  L)  I2) and the outow is equal to the number of rms
with projects who meet a bank with su¢ cient funds (BL).
Finally, for each value of S, (7) holds. The number of owners of risky assets increase when an investor
buys a risky asset from the bank which occurs at rate (S (N  B) I1) while each time a bank meets a rm,
one holder of a risky asset receives her payo¤, looses her risky asset and starts to look for a new one. This
happens at rate BL. If the number of agents who either owns or who is willing to buy a risky asset is M
then we have (M   S) owners of risky assets and S investors looking for a risky asset if the participation
constraint from Proposition 2 is fullled. Since (7) must hold for any value of S, M is irrelevant.
Depending on parameter values there are at most two equilibria.
Proposition 1. There always exists (for any c; z > 0) an equilibrium where rms do not start projects
and no investors want to buy a risky asset (B = L = 0).
Proof. If rms do not accept projects, L = BL = 0 and banks meet no rms with projects so the payo¤
of a risky asset is  z and therefore investors do not participate, S = 0:
Besides the no trade equilibrium there is also an equilibrium where trade takes place.
Proposition 2. If u > c r+BB and z > z
0 (r+L)
L there exists one equilibrium where B;L; S > 0, i.e.
investors buy risky assets, rms work out their plans and banks nance the investment projects.
Proof. See the appendix
These conditions follow from VP   VNP > c,and VNR > 0:
The equilibrium can be characterized as follows. First, we get from (8),
L =

(+ B)
: (9)
Substituting this in (7) gives:
S (N  B) (B + )  B = 0;
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which has one positive root for B.
B =
  (S (N   )  ) 
q
((S (N   )  ))2 + 42S2N
 2S : (10)
For (9) and (10) to be an equilibrium, we must check whether the conditions in Proposition 2 are fullled.
2.3 Welfare
Steady state welfare is given by the weighted value of all states (where the weights are determined by the
number of investors in each state).
r
  BrVF + (N  B)rVNF + LrVP + (1  L)rVNP + SrVNR + (M   S)rVR (11)
Obviously, the no trade equilibrium with B = L = S = 0 generates lower welfare than the trade equilibrium.
If S would be determined by free entry there would be too little entry because of the quadratic contact
technology and the fact that part of the returns to the investments go to the banks and rms.
2.4 A simple numerical example
This section illustrates that (i) for certain congurations, a ight to quality eliminates the e¢ cient trade
equilibrium, and (ii) that even if the trade equilibrium is not eliminated, social welfare increases more than
the total expected payo¤s that rms of risky assets receive when S goes from 0:5 to 1 (keeping M   S
constant and equal to 1). Details are in Appendix 3.
First, let
 = 1;  = 1;  = 1; S = 1; N = 0:5; r = 0:05:
Then B and L can be calculated from (9) and (10) which gives: B = 0:28 and L = 0:78: Then, using
Proposition 2, a trade equilibrium exists if u > 1: 27c and z > 1:18z0: Next, we can think of the ight to
quality as a reduction of S; suppose to 0:5: Then, B = 0:19 and L = 0:84. This equilibrium exists for
u > 1:27c and z > 1:18z0: So if u 2< 1:18c; 1:27c >; and the economy was in the trade equilibrium with
S = 1, the ight to quality destroys the equilibrium and the no-trade equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.
A less dark scenario is that u > 1:27c and z > 1:18z0, suppose u = z = 2 and c = z0 = 1. Then, the ight
to quality does not eliminate the trade equilibrium (although it could still push the economy in the no-trade
equilibrium). However, in that case, the total increase in welfare when S would go back to 1 exceeds the total
payo¤s that go to the rms of the risky assets. r
(1)  r
(0:5) = 0:08 > rVNR(1)  0:5  rVNR(0:5) = 0:04 :
This is due to the macroeconomic complementarities, see Cooper and John (1988).
In this very simple setting there are only two equilibria but it is easy to imagine that if rms are
heterogeneous in terms of the protability of their projects or if the investors who buy the risky asset pay
a xed entry cost (i.e. the cost of studying the protability of projects) there can be more than two Pareto
rankable equilibria. I also assumed that the investors bear all the risks but the model can be adjusted such
that the banks bear some risks, i.e. must pay back z0 after some time irrespective of whether they found a
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rm with a business plan or not. Banks will then only invest if they expect that there are enough rms with
projects and similarly, rms are only willing to develop their projects if they expect that there are enough
banks with funds. Finally, it is straightforward to make the risky asset more risky by letting some projects
fail at rate :
3 Discussion
During the credit crisis, banks engaged in deleveraging, which made it more di¢ cult for rms to nd banks
that were willing to supply loans which as an extreme case can be thought of as a reduction in  (it becomes
harder to nd a bank with su¢ cient capital): As mentioned before, the ight to quality can be interpreted as
a reduction in S. Because of the macro-economic complementarities, the ight to quality a¤ected the beliefs
of the rms which a¤ected the beliefs of the banks and vice versa. In normal times, the FED would buy
treasury bills in the federal-funds market to reduce the Federal funds rate but when this rate is essentially
zero, the di¤erence between treasury bills and cash vanishes. Lucas (2008) argues that the FED could still
satisfy the demand for quality by using reserves to buy other securities. In terms of the model above, if the
FED buys securities, it increases B:Without enough risk free securities, the desire to hold quality securities
just reduces the prices of other assets.
Is this is enough? Cochrane (2009) argues that sooner or later, rms and banks will realize that the 2%
returns to treasury bills is less attractive than the 9% returns for corporate bonds. This makes sense if there
is a unique market equilibrium and if we are temporarily in a disequilibrium However, in the presence of
coordination frictions, getting out of a low activity equilibrium requires a lot of coordination.
Caballero and Kurlat (2008) argue that in order to stop the extreme risk aversion, the government should
purchase some of the banks securities by an auction. This will signal to rms who play a waiting strategy
(for prices to fall further) that prices will stop falling and eliminate the gains from speculative waiting.
Finally, in the model, the social value of investing in risky assets is larger than the private value because
of macroeconomic complementarities. This suggests that we should, as Alesina and Zingales (2009) argue,
subsidize risk taking, for example by decreasing or eliminating the capital gain and dividend taxes.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
We must derive under which condition,
VP   VNP = Bu+ c
(r + B + )
> c
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or,
u > c
r + B
B
The participation constraint for the investors who buy risky assets is:
rVNR = (N  B) [VR   VNR   z0] > 0:
(6)-(5) gives
(VR   VNR) = Lz + (N  B)z
0
(r + L+ (N  B)) :
Plugging this in the participation constraint gives:
rVNR = (N  B)

Lz + (N  B)z0
(r + L+ (N  B))   z
0

> 0:
z >
z0 (r + L)
L
:
In the trade equilibrium, (2)-(1) yields:
(VP   VNP ) = Bu+ c
(r + B + )
substituting this back in (1) and (2)-(5) yields:
rVNP = 

Bu+ c
(r + B + )
  c

rVP = B

u  Bu+ c
(r + B + )

Similarly (4)-(3) yields:
(VF   VNF ) = Lu
r + L+ S
substituting this back in (3) and (4) gives,
rVNF = S

Lu
r + L+ S

rVF = L

u  Lu
r + L+ S

rVF = Lu

r + S
r + L+ S

:
Plugging (8) in (7) yields:
S (N  B) (B + )  B = 0
 SB2 + (S (N   )  )B + SN = 0
There is one positive solution for B:
B =
  (S (N   )  ) 
q
((S (N   )  ))2 + 42S2N
 2S
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B Numerical example (not to be included in the paper)
Since, the inow of investors does not depend on S (only on the number of contacts between banks with
funds and rms with projects), M   S can take any value and I decide to set it equal to 1. So we can think
of the ight to quality either as a drop in M or a drop in S (as I do here).
 = 1;  = 1;  = 1; S = 1;M   S = 1; N = 0:5; r = 0:05:
For those values, B = 0:28078 and L = 0:780 77: If the number of investors that is willing to take risks (S)
drops to 0:5, we get B = 0:18614 and L = 0:84307
First look at the constraints in Proposition 2 for a trade equilibrium for each of the values of B. First,
the rms want to trade for the various value of B if:
1
B + 0:05
(Bu  0:05c Bc) > 0
S = 1 : u > c
(1 + 20  0:28078)
20  0:28078 = 1:178 1c
S = 0:5 : u > c
(1 + 20  0:18614)
20  0:18614 = 1:268 6c
and investors want to buy risky assets if:
Lz + (N  B)z0
(r + L+ (N  B)) > z
0
S = 1 : z >
z0 (r + 0:186 14)
0:186 14
= 1:1921z0
S = 0:5 : z >
z0 (r + 0:84307)
0:84307
= 1:177 9z0
To calculate welfare and the social value of an investor who is willing to buy a risky asset, we use the
explicit solutions of the asset equations. Suppose that u and z are su¢ ciently high that both equilibria
exist, i.e.
u = 2; c = 1; z = 2; z0 = 1; B = 0:28078; L = 0:78077; S = 1
For the ows this implies:
S (N  B) = 0:22 = BL =  (1  L) :
The asset values for S = 1; B = 0:28078; L = 0:780 77 are given rst and then the asset values for
S = 0:5; B = 0:186 14 and L = 0:843 07 are calculated.
rVNF = S

Lu
r + L+ S

= 0:58671
rVF = Lu

r + S
r + L+ S

= 0:64538
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rVNP = 

Bu+ c
(r + B + )
  c

= 0:17342
rVP = B

u  Bu+ c
(r + B + )

= 0:23209
rVNR = (N  B)

Lz + (N  B)z0
(r + L+ (N  B))   z
0

= 0:12024
rVR = L

z   Lz + (N  B)z
0
(r + L+ (N  B))

  Lz + (N  B)z
0
(r + L+ (N  B)) = 0:19767
For S = 0:5; B = 0:186 14 and L = 0:843 07 :
rVNF = S

Lu
r + L+ S

= 0:66151
rVF = Lu

r + S
r + L+ S

= 0:72767
rVNP = 

Bu+ c
(r + B + )
  c

= 0:11013
rVP = B

u  Bu+ c
(r + B + )

= 0:165 64
rVNR = (N  B)

Lz + (N  B)z0
(r + L+ (N  B))   z
0

= 0:16644
rVR = L

z   Lz + (N  B)z
0
(r + L+ (N  B))

  Lz + (N  B)z
0
(r + L+ (N  B)) = 0:24296
r
  BrVF + (N  B)rVNF + LrVP + (1  L)rVNP + SrVNR + 1  rVR
r
(1)  B  0:64538 + (N  B)0:58671 + L  0:23209 + (1  L)0:17342 + S  0:12024 + 1  0:19767 = 0:88378
r
2(0:5)  B  0:66571 + (N  B)0:60519 + L  0:165 64 + (1  L)0:11013 + S  0:16644 + 1  0:24296 = 0:796 97
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